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mechanisms play an important role. For example, a person driving 
a car on a highway, when entering city limits, detects increased traf-
fic and enhances the focus on driving when compared to driving 
outside the city. A frequently used method to investigate dynamic 
behavioral adjustments across trials in the laboratory involves 
so-called conflict adaptation (Gratton et al., 1992). To investigate 
conflict adaptation effects, a response conflict task is used but, 
instead of focusing on RT interference, differences in RT interfer-
ence are compared as a function of the previous-trials (congruent 
or incongruent). The idea here is that when participants experience 
an incongruent trial, they up-regulate control so as to be in a better 
position to handle conflict in the subsequent trial – thus leading 
to reduced RT interference (relative to the situation in which the 
initial trial was congruent).
In conflict adaptation studies, the RT interference effect (I–C) on 
trials preceded by an incongruent trial is smaller than the RT inter-
ference effect (I–C) on trials preceded by a congruent trial. Thus, 
the overall RT pattern exhibits a two-way interaction. In the typical 
nomenclature used in these studies, incongruent trials following 
an incongruent one are termed “iI” trials, and incongruent trials 
following a congruent one are termed “cI” trials; likewise, congruent 
trials following a incongruent one are termed “iC” and congruent 
trials following a congruent one are termed “cC.” Thus, the RT inter-
action pattern implies that (iI − iC) < (cI − cC). Several theoretical 
accounts have been proposed to explain adaptation effects, includ-
ing conflict-monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001), feature-integration 
mechanisms involving priming (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 
2004), and expectancy mechanisms (Gratton et al., 1992). Although 
there is disagreement in the field about the exact nature of con-
flict adaptation effects, cognitive control mechanisms appear to 
be important even when one controls for potentially confounding 
effects (Egner, 2007).
IntroductIon
Previous studies have investigated interactions between emotion 
and executive function. For instance, during a working memory 
task, task-irrelevant negative images shown during the mainte-
nance period disrupted task performance to a larger extent than 
neutral images (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Anticevic et al., 2010). 
Other studies have probed interactions between emotion and con-
flict processing (Blair et al., 2007; Hart et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2011; 
Kanske and Kotz, 2011) and response inhibition (Verbruggen and 
De Houwer, 2007; Sagaspe et al., 2011; Pessoa et al., 2011), among 
others. What is the impact of emotion on executive functions? 
Recently, we proposed a dual competition model, which attempts 
to explain the interaction between emotion and executive function 
in terms of shared processing resources (Pessoa, 2009). According 
to the model, task performance is typically impaired in the pres-
ence of a task-irrelevant emotional stimulus because resources 
needed for the primary task are utilized, at least in part, toward 
the processing of the emotion-laden stimulus. For instance, when a 
task-irrelevant negative image was presented just before an incon-
gruent trial in a Stroop-like task, increased reaction time (RT) 
interference effects were reported (Hart et al., 2010). According 
to the dual competition model, a possible interpretation of this 
effect is that resources needed for conflict processing are shared 
or diverted by the processing of negative pictures – hence, the 
increased interference.
Previous studies that investigated the impact of emotion on 
response conflict focused on reactive control mechanisms. In these 
studies, interference effects are indexed by RT differences between 
incongruent (I) and congruent (C) trials, which can then be com-
pared between emotional and neutral conditions. But in many 
real life situations, cognitive control has to be adjusted dynami-
cally based on external demands. In such cases, proactive control 
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How does emotion interact with proactive control mechanisms 
such as those leading to conflict adaptation effects? In a recent study, 
emotional state was manipulated via a mood induction procedure to 
provoke negative (anxious, sad) or positive (happy, calm) states (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2010). Negative moods increased conflict adaptation 
effects relative to positive moods in a classic flanker task. Specifically, 
mood induction prior to the flanker task did not significantly change 
the overall conflict effect (I–C) between negative and positive moods 
although, intriguingly, conflict adaptation [(iI − iC) − (cI − cC)] 
increased during negative compared to positive mood. The latter result 
suggests that, under certain conditions, emotion can actually increase 
control processes. In a separate study, the same group reported that 
non-performance-contingent monetary reward reduced these conflict 
adaptation effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2009). Specifically, conflict 
adaptation [(iI − iC) − (cI − cC)] was significantly reduced during the 
reward compared to no-reward feedback condition, again with no 
significant differences in the basic conflict effect (I–C) between con-
ditions. Based on the latter findings, van Steenbergen and colleagues 
proposed that conflict itself may engender a brief negative affective 
state (Botvinick, 2007) that is counteracted by the delivery of reward 
(thus reducing conflict adaptation). Another recent study, however, did 
not detect an effect of anxiety (manipulated via anticipating shock) 
on conflict adaptation effects (Robinson et al., 2011).
The goal of the present study was to further probe the processes by 
which emotion interacts with proactive control. Here, we investigated 
how phasic manipulations of task-irrelevant emotion interacted with 
conflict-driven control effects. Participants performed a face-word 
interference task where they identified the gender of the face while 
ignoring overlaid words (Egner et al., 2010). Immediately following 
the face-plus-word stimulus, we presented a neutral or negative task-
irrelevant image and investigated how conflict adaptation was influ-
enced by the processing of these images. Based on our dual competition 
framework, we hypothesized that processing negative compared to 
neutral images between trials would expend or divert resources needed 
for control implementation. Thus, conflict adaptation effects would 
be reduced given that control would be compromised – for instance, 
the up-regulation of control following an incongruent trial would be 
impaired. Alternatively, a phasic manipulation of emotion could be 
expected to have a similar effect as more sustained emotional manipu-
lations, as described by Hommel and colleagues (van Steenbergen et al., 
2010). In this case, conflict adaptation effects would be expected to 
increase, as in their results. The present study thus evaluated the two 
competing hypotheses to better understand the interactions between 
negative emotion and conflict-driven control adjustments.
MaterIals and Methods
subjects
Thirty-eight, native English participants (24 females, age range: 
19–28 years) gave informed written consent and participated in 
the study, which was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
of Indiana University, Bloomington. All subjects were in good 
health, free of medication, and had no history of psychiatric or 
 neurological disease.
anxIety questIonnaIres
After providing consent to participate in the study, subjects filled 
the state–trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970).
stIMulI and task
Each trial started with the presentation of a white fixation cross 
for 500 ms followed by a compound face-plus-word stimulus for 
1 s (Figure 1). For the compound stimulus, images of male or 
female neutral faces were overlaid with words (“MALE”/“male” 
or “FEMALE”/“female”) to create congruent and incongruent trial 
types. After 200 ms from the offset of the compound stimulus, a 
neutral or negative image (see below) was shown for 500 ms. Each 
trial ended with a 500-ms inter-trial interval. Participants were 
instructed to press the “/” button on the keyboard with the right 
index finger if they saw a male face and the “z” button with the 
left index finger if they saw a female face, while ignoring the word 
(response button mapping was counterbalanced across partici-
pants). Participants were given 1200 ms from the stimulus onset to 
make a response. Participants were told to focus on the center of the 
monitor during the experimental blocks (see below) and they were 
informed that the presentation of neutral/negative image after each 
trial was task-irrelevant and did not depend on their performance.
For the presentation of visual stimuli and recording of partici-
pant’s responses, Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, 
Albany, CA, USA) was used. Before the start of the main experi-
mental blocks, participants performed a practice block for 2 min, 
where explicit performance feedback was provided after each trial 
(a different set of stimuli was used). Following the brief practice, 
each participant performed six blocks of trials, each lasting about 
2.5 min. Each block consisted of 48 trials, resulting in a total of 288 
trials for the entire experimental session.
All experimental conditions and stimuli were intermixed ran-
domly with the following constraints aimed at carefully balanc-
ing the order of experimental conditions, which is critical when 
studying conflict adaptation effects (Egner, 2007). The trial order 
of each block (except the first trial) was balanced in terms of previ-
ous- and current-trial congruency, specifically the following trial 
types: congruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (cC trials), 
Figure 1 | experimental paradigm. Two consecutive trials are shown, 
illustrating an incongruent trial preceded by an incongruent trial with a negative 
emotional picture between them. The current-trial is followed by a neutral 
image. For simplicity, non-critical parts of the trials were omitted.
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As outlined in the Section “Introduction,” the two competing 
hypothesis tested in this study predict a three-way interaction 
but with contrasting patterns. To understand the nature of the 
three-way interaction, we ran two additional two-way analyses 
(previous- × current-trial congruency) separately for neutral and 
negative conditions. A significant conflict adaptation effect (i.e., 
previous- × current-trial congruency interaction) was observed dur-
ing the neutral condition [F(1,37) = 7.13, p = 0.011, ηp2  = 0.16; 
Figure 2B]. In the neutral condition, the interference effect was 
almost reduced by half when trials were preceded by incongruent 
trials (18 ms) compared to when they were preceded by congru-
ent ones (35 ms). This is precisely the conflict adaptation pattern 
 incongruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (cI trials), congru-
ent trials preceded by an incongruent trial (iC trials), and incon-
gruent trials preceded by a incongruent trial (iI trials). Half of the 
trials from each of these four conditions were preceded by a neutral 
image, and the other half were preceded by a negative image. Trials 
were presented such that both the task-relevant feature (i.e., image 
of the face) and the task-irrelevant feature (i.e., overlaid word) 
of the compound stimulus were never physically the same across 
successive trials to minimize potential priming effects (Mayr et al., 
2003). In particular, note that words were not alternated between 
the two gender categories in successive trials. Instead, both upper 
and lower case words were used and alternated between these two 
cases in successive trials (Egner et al., 2010). Finally, in each of the 
eight conditions of our study, half of the trials were response–repeat 
trials and half of them were response-switch trials. A total of 72 
male and 72 female neutral face images were employed. Across the 
experiment, they were repeated only once; thus, they were shown 
once preceded by an incongruent trial and once preceded by a 
congruent trial. The identity of faces was counterbalanced across 
participants with respect to neutral and negative conditions.
To manipulate emotion, we employed images from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database (Lang et al., 
1997). Seventy-two neutral (normative valence ratings: 5.16 ± 0.12; 
normative arousal ratings: 3.62 ± 0.93) and 72 negative (normative 
valence ratings: 1.84 ± 0.25; normative arousal ratings: 6.29 ± 0.64) 
images were employed, including strongly emotional images such 
as mutilated bodies. Images were chosen so as to attempt to care-
fully balance them for content and complexity. They were repeated 
once (once preceded by a congruent trial, once preceded by an 
incongruent trial).
data analysIs
Following most conflict adaptation studies, we focused on RT data, 
although additional analyses of error rate data were undertaken. 
For the RT analysis, the first trial of each block, error trials, trials 
immediately following an error, and trials with an RT exceeding 
3 SD from the condition-specific mean (0.6% of the trials) were 
excluded in each participant. For the error rate data, the first trial 
of each run and trials that were preceded by an error were excluded. 
For each participant, mean RT and mean error rate data were deter-
mined as a function of previous-trial congruency (congruent, 
incongruent), current-trial congruency (congruent, incongruent) 
and image type between the previous- and current-trial (neutral, 
negative). Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
conducted on the mean RT and mean error rate data, with those 
variables as within-subject factors. We used an alpha-level of 0.05 
for all statistical tests.
results
Reaction time data (Table 1) were evaluated according to a 2 pre-
vious-trial congruency (congruent, incongruent) × 2 current-trial 
congruency (congruent, incongruent) × 2 emotion (neutral, nega-
tive) repeated-measures ANOVA. The main goal of this study was 
to investigate the effect of emotion on conflict adaptation. In other 
words, we were interested in evaluating a three-way interaction pat-
tern, which was indeed borne out by the RT data [F(1,37) = 4.22, 
p = 0.047, ηp2  = 0.10; Figure 2A].
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of the behavioral data.
 rT (ms) error rate (%)
NeuTral coNDiTioN
Congruent – Congruent (cC) trials 546.5 ± 8.1 4.1 ± 0.6
Incongruent – Congruent (iC) trials 544.8 ± 9.2 4.4 ± 0.7
Congruent – Incongruent (cI) trials 581.6 ± 9.0 11.1 ± 1.3
Incongruent – Incongruent (iI) trials 563.0 ± 8.7 9.5 ± 1.0
NegaTive coNDiTioN
Congruent – Congruent (cC) trials 549.1 ± 9.1 3.8 ± 0.5
Incongruent – Congruent (iC) trials 552.5 ± 9.2 4.0 ± 0.7
Congruent – Incongruent (cI) trials 579.7 ± 10.2 12.2 ± 1.1
Incongruent – Incongruent (iI) trials 582.1 ± 9.3 10.6 ± 1.2
Figure 2 | reaction time (rT) conflict adaptation effects. (a) Bar plot of 
interference (incongruent–congruent) RT effects based on previous-trial 
congruency displayed for both neutral and negative conditions. Error bars 
represent standard within-subject standard error bars (Loftus and Masson, 
1994) for the three-way interaction. (B) Mean RT data displayed as a function 
of previous- and current-trial congruency during trials preceded by neutral 
emotion and (c) negative emotion. Error bars in (B,c) represent standard 
within-subject standard error bars (Loftus and Masson, 1994) for the 
previous-trial congruency × current-trial congruency interaction.
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we correlated the conflict adaptation effect [(cI − cC) − (iI − iC)] 
with the corresponding error rates during the neutral and, sepa-
rately, negative conditions. We used robust regression for this analy-
sis to safeguard against potential outliers that can greatly affect the 
standard Pearson correlation (Wilcox, 2005). No significant linear 
relationship was observed between the RT data and error rate data 
in either neutral (robust R2 = 0.02, p = 0.608) or negative (robust 
R2 = 0.05, p = 0.206) conditions.
Finally, we correlated the observed differences in RT con-
flict adaptation effects between neutral and negative conditions 
[(cI − cC) − (iI − iC)]
NEGATIVE
 − [(cI − cC) − (iI − iC)
NEUTRAL
] with state 
and trait anxiety scores (in separate analyses) across participants. 
As in the above analysis, we used robust regression. No significant 
linear relationship was observed (state anxiety: robust R2 = 0.02, 
p = 0.600 and trait anxiety: robust R2 = 0.01, p = 0.830), but we 
report these negative findings here because of their theoretical 
relevance.
dIscussIon
In this study, we investigated interactions between emotion and 
proactive control mechanisms. Our main finding was that conflict 
adaptation decreased when a negative, task-irrelevant picture was 
shown between the main conflict-inducing stimuli. Next, we discuss 
some of the implications of our findings.
Generally speaking, two classes of predictions could have been 
made concerning the influence of emotion on conflict adaptation. 
On the one hand, models that suggest that emotion and cognition 
share processing resources would predict that conflict adaptation 
would decrease in the conditions of our experiment (e.g., Wyble 
et al., 2008; Pessoa, 2009). This is because the processing of high-
intensity negative images engages processing resources that are also 
needed by cognition. For instance, subjects may implicitly regu-
late their emotional reaction to the aversive stimulus. In this case, 
mechanisms needed for successful regulation may tap into those 
also needed to dynamically regulate control. In this manner, partici-
pants are less able to up-regulate control after an incongruent trial 
and, hence, a subsequent incongruent trial will exhibit substantial 
response interference.
According to the conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 
2001), conflict-driven control adjustments happen because top-
down attentional mechanisms are triggered after conflict is detected. 
These regulatory mechanisms would then exert top-down control 
during the subsequent trial, leading to decreased interference. Thus, 
a potential interpretation of our results is that the processing of 
a negative stimulus might consume/divert resources needed for 
top-down control engagement, leading to poorer control on the 
subsequent trial.
Recently, Mansouri et al. (2009) proposed a model for conflict-
driven control adjustments based on mnemonic processes. Their 
model proposes that, after the initial detection of conflict on an 
incongruent trial, the information about the experienced conflict 
is stored in short-term memory. This information is then used to 
exert top-down control during the subsequent trial. At the same 
time, there are studies that reported disruption of working memory 
performance by task-irrelevant, negative pictures shown during the 
maintenance period (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Anticevic et al., 
2010). Taken together, an alternative interpretation of our results 
reported in the literature. In contrast, during the negative condition, 
a conflict adaptation effect (i.e., previous- × current-trial congruency 
interaction) was not observed [F(1,37) = 0.03, p = 0.867, ηp2  = 0.00; 
Figure 2C]. In fact, the interference effect on the trials preceded by 
incongruent trials (29 ms) was nearly identical to the one on the 
trials preceded by congruent trials (30 ms).
For completeness, all statistical results are provided in Table 2. 
Of note, the main effect of current-trial congruency was significant 
[F(1,37) = 75.33, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.67], revealing the standard 
response conflict effect. As expected, mean RT was slower on incon-
gruent (577 ms) compared to congruent (548 ms) condition. The 
main effect of emotion was significant [F(1,37) = 10.23, p = 0.003, 
ηp2  = 0.22], such that the mean RT of trials preceded by negative 
images was slower (566 ms) compared to those preceded by neutral 
images (559 ms).
We also analyzed error rate data. A 2 previous-trial congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) × 2 current-trial congruency (congruent, 
incongruent) × 2 emotion (neutral, negative) repeated-measures 
ANOVA on error rate data (Table 1) did not reveal a three-way 
interaction [F(1,37) = 0.01, p = 0.918, ηp2  = 0.00]. Other results 
of interest related to main effects and interactions are as fol-
lows. The main effect of current-trial congruency was significant 
[F(1,37) = 57.33, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.61], such that errors were more 
frequent during incongruent (11%) compared to congruent (4%) 
trials; other main effects were not significant (Fs < 1.5; ps > 0.2). The 
two-way interaction between previous- and current-trial congruency 
was statistically significant [F(1,37) = 6.01, p = 0.019, ηp2  = 0.14], 
demonstrating the typical conflict adaptation effect, such that inter-
ference (incongruent vs. congruent) was lower after incongruent 
trials (6%) compared to after congruent trials (8%).
Next, we sought to confirm that differences in conflict adapta-
tion effects observed in the RT data during neutral and negative 
conditions were not caused by a speed–accuracy tradeoff. To do so, 
Table 2 | Statistical results from repeated-measures aNova analysis on 
the behavioral data.
 rT error 
  rate
 F(1,37) ηp2  F(1,37) ηp2
MaiN eFFecTS
Current-trial congruency 75.33*** 0.67 57.33*** 0.61
Previous-trial congruency 3.43 0.08 1.48 0.04
Emotion 10.23** 0.22 0.54 0.01
Two-way iNTeracTioNS
Previous × current-trial 3.39 0.08 6.01* 0.14 
congruency
Emotion × current-trial 1.05 0.03 1.95 0.05 
congruency
Emotion × previous-trial 9.93** 0.21 0.01 0.00 
congruency
Three-way iNTeracTioN
Previous × current-trial 4.22* 0.10 0.01 0.00 
congruency × emotion
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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experiencing conflict are distinct from those obtained when viewing 
highly negative images, the present findings indicate that models 
of conflict processing need to be extended so as to incorporate 
mechanisms of cognitive–emotional interactions.
In conclusion, we investigated the effects of negative emo-
tion on conflict-driven control mechanisms by using a face-word 
Stroop-like task. We found that conflict adaptation effects were 
significantly reduced during the negative emotional condition. We 
interpret the current findings in terms of shared resources between 
the processing of negative emotional stimuli and proactive control 
mechanisms. Our findings demonstrate that emotion interacts with 
executive mechanisms responsible for dynamic behavioral adjust-
ments that are tied to environmental demands, a central facet of 
flexible, goal-directed behavior.
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would be then that the processing of negative pictures disrupted the 
working memory representation of the experienced conflict, lead-
ing to reduced behavioral adjustments during the subsequent trial.
The findings of studies by Hommel and colleagues (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010) suggest that negative emotion 
might increase conflict adaptation. In particular, van Steenbergen 
et al. (2010) suggested that conflict adaptation is sensitive to the 
modulation of pleasure level. The present findings run counter 
this suggestion, at least when the manipulation involves a phasic 
 stimulus – van Steenbergen et al. (2010) investigated a longer-last-
ing mood manipulation. It is also worth noting that it has been 
suggested that conflict signals are aversive in nature and might lead 
to the selection of strategies that reduce conflict in future occur-
rences (Botvinick, 2007). Based on this notion, van Steenbergen 
et al. (2009) suggested that non-performance-contingent reward 
acted as a positive event that canceled out the negative experience of 
a conflict signal, thus leading to a reduction in control adjustments 
– given that conflict was less aversive in such cases. According to 
this interpretation, one would expect that viewing a negative image, 
such as the mutilated-body stimuli employed here, after the conflict 
signal would increase the overall aversive level. And to reduce task 
aversiveness, participants would increase subsequent behavioral 
control. Again, our results run counter this prediction. Although, in 
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